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INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED LOAN TO
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed
loan to the Republic of Korea for the equivalent of US$100.0 million to help
finance the foreign exchange cost of a fifth railway project. The total
project cost is estimated at $292.0 million equivalent of which the foreign
exchange component is expected to amount to $185.0 million equivalent. The
remaining $85.0 million of the foreign exchange expenditure will be met
through borrowing from other foreign sources as indicated in the Financing
Plan which forms part of Annex III. The loan would have a term of 25 years,
including five years of grace, with interest at 8-1/2 percent per annum.
PART I - THE ECONOMY
Background
2. The last economic report ("Current Economic Position and Prospects
of the Republic of Korea") was distributed under cover of R74-42 dated
March 4, 1974. An assessment of Korea's economic situation is given below.
An Economic Updating Mission returned in February 1975 after completing its
field work in Korea; its report is under preparation. The Country Data
Sheets are included in Annex I.
3. Korea's economic performance over the last decade has been out-
standing. In the period 1964-73, the GNP growth rate averaged 10 percent
a year in real terms and real per capita income more than doubled. The
rapid rise of output and an appreciable decline in the population growth
rate (from nearly 2.7 percent in the early sixties to 1.7 percent in 1973)
were major reasons for the rapid increase in income. A key factor in the
growth of the economy has been the increase of manufactured exports from
about $60 million in 1964 to $2,800 million in 1973. Such exports in 1973
accounted for over 90 percent of commodity exports and about 29 percent of
industrial output. The ratio of exports to GNP rose rapidly from 4 percent
in 1964 to 27 percent in 1973 and the manufacturing sector as a proportion
of GNP increased from 16 percent to 28 percent in the same period. Agricul-
ture, which has had a growth rate of about 3.5 percent a year over the past
several years, declined as a proportion of GNP from 46 percent in 1964 to
23 percent in 1973.
4. Rapid growth transformed the Korean economy from one characterized
by dependence on agriculture and sluggish growth in the 1950s to one of
dynamic growth based on increasing industrialization in the 1960s. Never-
theless, there have been problems. The two which have caused the Korean
Government most concern are (a) the resource management problem, resulting
from a heavy reliance on external capital and (b) the question of distri-
bution of growth benefits, arising out of a faster productivity growth in
manufacturing than in agriculture.
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5. Total real investment grew six-fold between 1964 and 1973, and
the ratio of investment to GNP rose from 13 percent to 25 percent. External
resource requirements also grew rapidly during 1970-71 averaging over 9
percent of GNP, roughly the same level as in the early sixties. The
marginal saving rate during the last decade was 30 percent which would
indicate that the large capital inflows did not weakened efforts to mobilize
resources domestically. Korea, however, entered upon a period of rapid
growth with a very low level of domestic savings and, therefore, in the
interest of rapid acceleration of investment and growth tolerated relatively
heavy dependence on external capital. In the early seventies when financial
difficulties resulted from bunching of payments due on short and medium
term debt and a sharp rise in the debt service ratio, the Government
took corrective action to moderate the rate of private investment, to
increase the inflow of capital on concessional terms from official sources,
to impose restrictions on suppliers' credits, and to improve the balance
of payments position through substantial exchange rate adjustments.
6. These measures, combined with a reduction in Government real
investment and uncertainty in the Korean business community about export
prospects, produced a marked slowdown in the economy during the 1970-72
period. Even with a continued high rate of export expansion (about 50 per-
cent per annum on average in current terms), real GNP growth averaged only
8 percent per annum during 1970-72, compared with about 13 percent in the
preceding three years. Real investment stagnated during 1970-72, and the
ratio of fixed investment to GNP dropped from 27 percent in 1969 to 22 per-
cent in 1972.
7. Although income distribution in Korea is generally more equitable
than in comparable developing countries, the benefits of economic growth
have not been shared evenly. The absolute gap in incomes between urban
and rural areas widened during the 1960s despite a massive migration to the
cities. Growth of labor productivity in agriculture has been considerably
slower than in the manufacturing sector. Since 1967, the Government has
attempted to raise farm incomes and to provide incentives for increasing
foodgrain production through a price support system for rice and barley.
These measures reduced markedly the gap between average rural and urban
incomes during 1968-72. Nevertheless, growth of the industrial sector is
likely to continue to be more rapid than that of the agricultural sector,
and the Government believes that, unless the proportion of rural incomes
provided by non-farm sources is increased, the disparity of incomes will
tend to widen. Therefore, the Governtent broadened its efforts to achieve
more balanced growth by pursuing policies of decentralizing industry and
emphasizing investment in the less developed regions, and in late 1971
initiated the Sae Maeul (New Community) Movement as a nationwide comprehensive
self-help program to increase productivity and incomes in the rural areas,
where nearly half the population still lives, and to improve the quality of
rural life.
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Recent Changes
8. During the last two years or so the Korean economic situation has
been subject to sudden and sharp changes. Beginning with the latter part
of 1972, the Korean economy witnessed an unprecedented boom. 1973 was
an exceptional year, even by Korean standards, and set new records of
growth in GNP, exports and savings. GNP grew by 16.5 percent in real
terms, primarily because of increases in exports and fixed investment.
Commodity exports, in nominal terms, rose by over 90 percent, denoting
an increase in real terms of about 60 percent. National savings, which
had dropped to about 15 percent of GNP in 1972, rose to 22 percent in
1973, surpassing the previous peak (1970) of about 18 percent. Foreign
savings were only about 3 percent of GNP and financed only about 12 percent
of total investment, compared with about 40 percent from 1968 to 1971. The
rapid rise in foreign exchange earnings, which included a marked increase
in tourism income, also reduced the ratio of debt service payments to export
receipts to about 10 percent in 1973.
9. The remarkable performance of the economy in 1973 encouraged
both business and Government to view the future with increased confidence.
In the latter part of 1973, Korean economic aspirations were expressed
in terms of targets of $1,000 per capita income and $10 billion of exports
by the early 1980's. The long-term strategy implied the continuation over
the next decade of the overall rate of GNP growth of about 10 percent per
annum but with reduced dependence, in relative terms, on net inflows from
abroad. At the same time, major structural shifts were being planned for
manufacturing. The objective of deepening the industrial structure was to
be achieved by emphasizing shipbuilding, steel, petrochemical and metal-
working industries, while continuing to develop existing industries such as
textiles and electronics. The long-term plan also provided for the achieve-
ment of parity between rural and urban household incomes by the early 1980's
through accelerated growth in labor productivity in agriculture and an
increase in off-farm employment by greater regional dispersion of industry.
10. The favorable economic developments of 1973 were interrupted by
external developments in 1974. The sharp rise in the Price of petroleum
in late 1973, the recession in the Japanese and the U.S. economies during
1974, and the high level of foodgrain import prices have combined to bring
about a major change in the short-term economic position of Korea. Owing
to its poor natural resource endowment and because of its economic structure
and growth strategy, Korea was severely affected by these recent international
developments. Merchandise exports now account for about 30 percent of GNP
in Korea and dependence on the Japanese and U.S. markets has remained heavy.
A major element in the Korean export picture during 1973 was an expansion
of over 200 percent in exports to Japan, which was made possible by a very
sizeable expansion in total Japanese imports. Nearly 75 percent of total
Korean exports went to the U.S. and Japan during 1973. Korea was thus
particularly vulnerable to the recession in the Japanese and U.S. economies
during 1974. The revival of the Japanese economy and the future trend in
Japanese manufactured goods imports will probably continue to be major
determinants of the Korean growth rate in the future, although the Government
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is making efforts to diversify its export markets by encouraging sales in
the Middle East and Europe.
11. In the short-run, however, the higher costs of energy and food
imports have added a burden to the economy which is even more serious
than the setback to export growth. Korean dependence on imported fuels
is not only extremely heavy but is very closely linked to essential indus-
trial and transport uses. The passenger vehicle fleet is small, with only
one private car per 152 families; truck transport and diesel-powered rail
traffic are the basic transport modes for commercial goods. The higher
costs of petroleum added almost $800 million to the Korean import bill
between 1972 and 1974. Over the same period, the three-fold rise in the
prices of foodgrains increased foreign exchange requirements by more than
$350 million, despite a decline in the volume of imports. Korea is at
present importing about 2 million tons of wheat and about half a million
tons of rice annually, constituting respectively 85 percent and 11 percent
of total domestic consumption. Together petroleum and foodgrains accounted
for 36 percent of Korea's increased import bill in 1974 and 25 percent of
total import payments that year.
12. These international developments have greatly weakened the Korean
balance of payments position in 1974 and prospectively in 1975, slowed the
rate of growth of output and employment and increased inflationary pressures.
13. The current account balance of payments deficit widened from the
low level of $308 million in 1973 to an estimated $1,440 million during
1974, or by more than $1,100 million. The major factors in the deterioration
were an adverse swing in the terms of trade of 16 percent (equivalent to
a loss of about 5 percent of GNP) and a large negative balance on the
services account, due in part to a decline in tourism receipts. The
deterioration was notwithstanding a substantial further improvement in
real exports of about 10 percent, to a total of $4.8 billion, and only
a modest growth in real imports. The entire improvement in export volume
was concentrated in the first half of 1974. Real export earnings in the
final quarter of 1974 are estimated to have been six percent below the
corresponding quarter of 1973.
14. At current prices, total import payments (c.i.f.) are estimated
to have been about $6.9 billion in 1974, an increase of $2.3 billion, or
about 63 percent, over 1973. But iTI real terms, imports are estimated
to have increased by little more than 2 percent in 1974, mainly as a result
of decreases in imports of grains and capital goods, and only a small
increase in raw materials.
15. It is estimated that the net inflows of capital (medium and long-
term loans and foreign private investment) into Korea during 1974 remained
at the 1973 level of about $1 billion. Consequently, the increased ..urrelit
account deficit had to be financed entirely through an increase in private
short-term debt, a reduction of external reserves, Bank of Korea borrowings
abroad and drawings on the IMF gold tranche and first credit tranche and
the use of the IMF oil facility. Korea's net international reserves, which
stood at about $945 million at the end of 1973, had declined to about $90
million by the end of 1974. The rundown of net reserves enabled the
maintenance of levels of imports and economic activity in 1974 which otherwise
would not have been possible.
16. Notwithstanding the Government's policy, the impact of external
developments on Korea's domestic output, employment and prices has been
marked. In the first half of 1974, GNP continued to grow in real terms by
14 percent over the corresponding period of 1973, as industrial output and
real exports continued to increase and fixed investment remained at a
relatively high level. In the second half of the year, however, there was
a sharp slowdown in industrial output, private fixed investment and export
sales (particularly for textiles and plywood). The GNP for the second half
of 1974 is estimated to have been only about 3 percent above the level in
the latter half of 1973. Despite the levelling off of industrial production
there was a substantial build up in inventories of export products. Unemploy-
ment began to rise as a result of the combined effects of the industrial
slowdown, business failures and temporary closures. Between August and
November, 20,000 workers were idled. Failures of over 100 businesses in
textiles, ceramics and electronics were reported and more than 250 others
experienced temporary closures for varying periods. More than 650 businesses
partially curtailed operations. Open unemployment at the end of 1974 is
estimated to have reached about 600,000, or about 5 percent of the labor
force, compared with an average of about 4 percent in 1973. However,
because of less overtime, fewer shifts and partial workweeks, the real
increase in unemployment and the decline in real wages was much greater.
17. Imported inflation has led to a very sharp upward pressure on the
domestic price level. In addition to the sharply higher prices of imported
petroleum and foodgrains, the average unit value of other imports increased
by 45 percent during 1974. 1/ Consequently, the rate of domestic inflation
accelerated with consumer prices rising at an annual rate of 31 percent
between December 1973 and June 1974 and wholesale prices increasing at
double that rate. Since the middle of the year the rate of domestic in-
flation has slowed somewhat, reflecting seasonal factors, the slower
increase in the prices of imported goods and the dampening effects of
rising inventories of manufactured goods. It is estimated that during
calendar year 1974, wholesale prices rose by about 45 percent.
18. In general, the Government is committed to accepting necessary
adjustments arising from higher energy and other import costs. It was
not, however, prepared to place on consumers the full burden of higher
import costs of basic foodstuffs. Thus, despite dramatic increases in
prices paid by consumers for foodgrains, substantial subsidies are still
1/ The unit value of exports also increased during the year, but by only
34 percent.
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involved in the sale of wheat and rice. Complete avoidance of these subsidies
at a time of growing unemployment and declining real wages in manufacturing
was considered inequitable. Nevertheless, the Government intends to move
during 1975 to reduce the deficit on the grain account which has largely
offset public savings during the last two years.
Government's Response to Higher Import Prices
and Reduced International Trade
19. The Government began early in 1974 to take action to limit the
growth of imports. In January, the general exemption from customs duties
available for machinery imports for the export sector was eliminated. Taxes
on luxury imports and a number of domestically produced commodities were
raised. However, finished non-food consumer goods comprise a relatively
small share of Korea's total imports (about 5 percent in 1973), so there has
been limited scope for cutting down on non-essential imports. To reduce
demand for petroleum products, tax rates including tariffs on private cars
were raised substantially.
20. Because of slack demand, the burden of financing inventories
and continued increases in costs, a growing number of industries faced
serious cashflow problems in the second half of the year. This prompted
a number of mid-year changes in Governmental policies. The generally tight
financial policies in effect in the first half of the year were eased,
credits for imported and domestic industrial inputs were increased and
programs to purchase excess stocks and make available special credits to
smaller businesses were begun or expanded.
21. The Government in December 1974 introduced a set of special
measures to offset the sluggish demand for exports that had been experienced
since mid-year. It expanded the program of export financing and provided
loans for the stockpiling of essential raw materials. Credits to exporters
for the purchase of imported raw materials and domestic goods were increasedl.
On December 7, 1974, the currency was devalued by 17.5 percent to Won 485
per US dollar. The devaluation was not expected to increase exports appre-
ciably because of the depressed state of Korea's overseas markets, but like
some of the other measures, it was intended to improve the liquidity position
of manufacturing enterprises. It should also improve the competitive position
of import substitution industries which had been weakened during the year.
But the devaluation will also result in continued inflationary pressures
in 1975. Among measures taken by the Government to help the low income
groups are substantial income tax relief, a 30 percent increase in salaries
of Government employees and public works projects mainly in the urban areas
to alleviate unemployment. The rural areas appear to have been hit less hard
by domestic inflation. The terms of trade moved further in favor of the
farmers during 1974 as the support price for rice was adjusted sharply upward.
22. The past year has been a period of very difficult adjustments
for Korea which, by and large, have been made quickly and with realism.
The Government rightly views some of iLs current economic problems as being
7-
essentially short-term in nature. It assumes that a recovery in the growth
rate of OECD countries will take place in the second half of 1975, in which
event Korean merchandise exports could be expected to increase by 10 to 12
percent in real terms for the year as a whole. Private fixed investment may
remain depressed for some months but the Government intends to stimulate
business and employment through increased public sector outlays, especially
for irrigation, farmland reclamation, highway construction, housing and urban
waterworks. For example, about 87,000 units of housing, in addition to
the 112,000 units orignally planned will be undertaken in 1975, and about
334,000 new jobs are to be created in the public sector with hiring priority
to be given to unemployed persons in the low income groups. In addition
to increased capital expenditures, the Government proposes to continue
purchasing and stockpiling surplus inventories of such major industries
as textiles and plywood, for later release when the export and domestic
markets are more favorable. The overall budgetary deficit is expected to
be substantially larger than in 1974 and it is to be financed mainly by
borrowing from the Bank of Korea and from abroad. The Government is expected
to restrict the expansion of credit in low priority areas, raise interest
rates and increase the reserve requirements for banks to moderate inflationary
pressures. Essentially, the Government's strategy is to minimize damage to
the private sector during the current period,of slack demand, so that when
international economic activity picks up the Korean export sector will be
able to respond. Excessive business failures and loss of capacity in the
private sector during the present slump would make recovery of the Korean
economy slower and more costly.
23. The considerable uncertainty surrounding the international economic
situation makes it difficult to assess confidently Korea's economic pros-
pects for 1975. The Government hopes that, with its antirecessionary
measures, aided by a recovery in OECD countries in the second half of 1975,
GNP in real terms may increase by 6-7 percent and industrial output by as
much as 14 percent. However, if the recovery in the export markets is
delayed, industrial growth would be less vigorous, perhaps in the range of
10 percent, and levels of unemployment and underemployment would be even
higher.
24. Even with a recovery in the OECD countries later this year,
Korea will face a large current account deficit estimated at about $1,700 bil-
lion. This estimate assumes that merchandise exports will increase by 10 per-
cent in real terms during 1975, that real import growth will be limited to
less than 9 percent, and that some marginal improvement (about 2 percent)
in the terms of trade will take place. An overall import growth of around
9 percent will permit 11-12 percent growth in petroleum, food and raw
materials imports and a modest increase in capital goods imports. With a
slower growth of imports it would be difficult to maintain an adequate
level of food supplies and to achieve the expected recovery of industrial
output and exports in the second half of 1975. Finding the means to finance
the large external deficit is Korea's most urgent economic challenge. The
servicing of the sizeable foreign borrowing required should not pose serious
difficulties for Korea given the present low debt service ratio and continued
good long-term prospects for export growth, provided that the proportion of
added debt incurred on short and medium terms and at high interest rates is
not too great. Korean export growth, which in real terms averaged approxi-
mately 30 percent a year during the last decade cannot be expected to be
sustained at that rate in the future. Considering, however, that 90 percent
of Korea's exports now, and prospectively, consists of manufactured goods,
thiat its links with the Japanese economv remain strong, that vigorous
efforts are being made to penetrate new markets, especially in the Middle
East, and that progress has already been made in diversifying the in-
dustrial structure, a long-term real growth rate of exports of 10 to
12 percent seems entirely possible even if world trade in manufactures
should expand comparatively slowly. With the prospect of slower growth
in exports than in the past, Korea's plans already envisage greater emphasis
on import substitution in agriculture, especially foodgrains, and in
industry with special emphasis on increasing the domestic value added in
exports. Forecasts of developments in the world economy and their impact
on Korea which is so dependent upon them are especially difficult to make
at this time. However, given Korea's record of successful economic manage-
ment in the past 10 years and the skills, adaptability, vigor and invent-
iveness of its workers and entrepreneujrs, one can be confident that ways
will be found to surmount the problems facing the economy.
PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS
25. As of February 28, 1975, Korea had received 16 Bank loans and 8 IDA
credits, amounting in total to $517.2 million in loans and $107.0 million in
credits (taking into account cancellations and the refinancing of one IDA
credit in a subsequent Bank loan).
26. About one-half of the total has been for the transport sector -
$119.7 million for railways, $101.5 million for highways and $80 million
for ports. $130.5 millioTn has gone to agricultural projects - $93 million
for irrigation projects, $7 million for livestock development, $10.5 million
for the provision of medium- and long-term credit through the National Agri-
cultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), $7 million for seeds production and
$13.0 million for an integrated agricultural products processing project.
The Korea Development Finance Corporation (KDFC) has received $95 million
in Bank loans for relending to private industry. The balance of $97.8 mil-
lion was for two education projects, a tourism project, and a secondary
cities regional project.
27. IFC has made six investments in Korea and its gross commitments
amounted to $21.1 million in loans and shares. 1/ It made its first equity
investment in KDFC, of $0.7 million or 14 percent of KDFC's paid-in capital,
1/ A seventh investment in the Atlas Paper Co. amounting to $5 million
was cancelled at the request of the Company.
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at the time the Bank made its first loan to KDFC. A loan of $1.4 million to,
and an equity investment of S0.3 million in, the Honam Silk Co. was made in
1969. In 1971, IFC purchased $0.7 million of the shares of the Korea In-
vestment and Finance Corporation - an institution whose function is to assist
in the development of the capital and money markets, a further investment of
about $0.3 million was made in 1974. In July 1973, the IFC exercised
preemptive rights and purchased at par about $400,000 equivalent of KDFC's
common stock. In June 1974) IFC approved an investment of $17.3 million in
the Gold Star Company Ltd. consisting of a loan of $16.0 million and $1.3
million in equity. Gold Star is a leading electronics manufacturer. In-
vestments of $9 million in Tong Yang Nylon Co., Ltd., and about $3.5 million
in Hae Un Dae Development Co., Ltd. for hotel development and an investment
of approximately $585,000 in and a loan of $5.0 million to the Korea Secu-
rities Finance Corporation have been approved.
28. Of total Bank and IDA lending, about $273.9 million remained un-
disbursed on effective loans and credits as at February 28, 1975. The rate
of disbursements has increased in recent months. Annex II contains a summary
statement of Bank loans, IDA credits, and IFC investments as of that date
and notes on the execution of ongoing projects. As indicated in the notes,
progress on project implementation is generally satisfactory, although
difficulties have been encountered with some projects and most seriously with
the Pyongtaek-Kumgang and Yong San Gang Irrigation Projects (Loan 600-KO and
Loan 795/Credit 283, respectively).
29. The Bank's program for FY75 includes four operations in addition to
the proposed loan: the secondary cities regional project, a first loan to
the Korea Development Bank (KDB), a program loan and a third education project.
All of these have been approved.
30. The emphasis which the Government places on agricultural and rural
development will be reflected in the programs for the succeeding years FY76
and FY77. The report of the agriculture sector mission (R73-287, dated
December 19, 1973) provided the basis for developing additional high prior-
itv agricultural projects. A second livestock project, the second stage of
the Yong San Gang Irrigation Project, the Okseo irrigation and regional
development project and the Miho Cheon and Naeseong-Cheon watershed devel-
opment projects have already been identified and are under preparation, a
rural infrastructure project and follow-on projects in agricultural credit
and agricultural products processing are also being considered.
31. Another major emphasis in Korea's current plans is the development
of industries such as steel, shipbuilding and machine tools. Ilitherto, the
Bank's lending for industry to Korea has been solely through the KDFC. A
loan for industrial development through a second financial intermediary,
the Korea Development Bank (KDB) was approved on March 20, 1975. Also under
- 10 -
consideration is a loan to the Medium Industry Bank which provides financing
to smaller businesses and a fifth loan to KDFC.
32. The development of the industrial and agricultural sectors and of
exports will require concurrent infrastructural development. Although the
transport sector will be given relatively less emphasis than in the past,
the investments required are large, and thus there is considerable support
for this sector in the proposed program.
33. The Government is intensifying its efforts to prepare projects
suitable for external official financing in the fields of infrastructure,
agriculture and regional development. The foreign exchange component of
such projects is low, partly because they consist largely of civil works,
and Korea's construction industry is efficient and well organized and wins
an overwhelming proportion of contracts put out to international competition;
its dependence on imports is expected to lessen in the future. Moreover,
the country's capacity to meet its requirements of machinery and equipment
from domestic sources is also increasing. Korea's need for official aid
therefore cannot be met if financing is confined to the foreign exchange costs
of projects. For this reason the Bank should continue to be prepared to
finance, in appropriate cases, a portion of local costs.
PART III - THE TRANSPORT SECTOR
The Bank Group's Role in the Sector's Development
34. The evolution of the transport sector in Korea is seen most clearly
when viewed in the context of the remarkable growth and structural change
experienced by the economy during recent years. Manufacturing output grew
at an annual average rate of 18 percent in the 1960-73 period and the export
of manufacturers at an even faster rate. This rapid expansion of production
and exports placed a severe strain on the transport sector, mainly because
relatively modest amounts were invested in the enlargement of its capacity
during the First Development Plan Period (1962-1966).
35. During the Second Plan (1967-71) period, the demand for transport
facilities increased at an even faster pace than many of the other indicators
of economic growth. Domestic passenger traffic (in terms of passenger
kilometers) increased at the annual average rate of 11 percent and freight
traffic (in ton-kilometers) at 19 percent; international traffic handled
through the ports rose by 22 percent a year. The Government realized that
the further growth of the dynamic private sector could be seriously impeded
by the growing bottlenecks in transport infrastructure. Accordingly, the
allocation for investment in transport was raised from 17 percent of the
Government's capital expenditure in the First Plan period to 27 percent for
the Second Plan. During this period, over 240 billion Won was committed for
the improvement of the railways, the construction of new and maintenance of
existing roads and the expansion of port and airport capacity. The demand
for transport services has continued to grow during the first three years
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of the Third Plan Period (1972-1976) during the course of which the Govern-
ment intends to invest about 490 billion Won roughly $1,000 million in
transport infrastructure or just over a quarter of total governmental capital
expenditure proposed in the Plan.
36. The Bank Group's association with the Government's efforts to
modernize and expand the transport sector in Korea dates back to 1962, when
a $14.0 million Credit was made to help finance the First Railway Project.
The railroad system, which had been rehabilitated following the Korean War,
was at that time the only means for the large-scale movement of goods and
passengers since the country had a very small network of paved roads and
few motor vehicles. The rapid economic progress of the succeeding years
called for a wider range of transport services. In 1965, the Bank made a
technical assistance grant for a comprehensive survey of land transportation
modes, which was carried out by consultants. Their report, which was
completed in late 1966, concluded that the railways could be expected to
handle most of the country's freight traffic, of which a large proportion
consisted of moving bulk commodities over relatively long distances and
that since the road-system was inadequate the Government should emphasize
highway improvement in its development programs. It suggested that an
organization to coordinate transport policy was needed. In 1968, the
Association extended a $3.5 million technical assistance credit (Cr. S-4KO)
to help finance feasibility and detailed engineering studies to improve the
highway network and a study on transport coordination. A UNDP-financed
port development study was initiated in 1971 with the Bank acting as the
Executing Agency. The UNDP study recommended an investment plan for Korea's
17 first-class ports.
37. The Bank Group's lending operations have been directed towards
assisting the program of investments which stemmed from a review of the
recommendations of the various studies referred to in the previous paragraph.
The Korean National Railroad (KNR) has continued to receive Bank Group
support to improve and expand its services. To date, KNR has received
about $120 million in the form of loans and credits to help finance four
projects. In June 1973, the Bank made an $80 million loan to support
the expansion of two ports -- Busan and Mukho. Following the studies
financed from the proceeds of the technical assistance Credit S-4KO, a Bank
loan (769-KO) of $54.5 million was made in 1971 to finance the construction
of about 400 kilometers of national highway feasibility and detailed
engineering studies (covering 900 additional kilometers of priority roads),
a highway maintenance study and the purchase of equipment and spare parts
for a pilot highway maintenance program. The studies and maintenance
program led to the formulation of the Second Highway Project for which a
loan of $47.0 million (956-KO) was approved in early 1974; it is progressing
satisfactorily.
38. The Government has made efforts to improve transport coordination.
Following extensive discussions between the Government and the Bank, a
Transportation Planning Office (TPO) was set up under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) in 1970. Its main functions are to
collect data, and assist in the assessment of major investment proposals.
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TPO is controlled by, and reports to, a Transport Coordination Ministers
Conference (TCMC) consisting of eight cabinet members whose ministries are
most concerned with transport matters. TPO's work is supervised by a
Transport Coordination Working Group (TCWG--a Civil Servic Committee on
which the same ministries are represented). TPO encountered a series of
teething troubles, especially in recruiting adequately qualified staff.
Certain measures designed to increase TPO's effectiveness were discussed
during the negotiations for the Second Highway Project in November 1973 and
were to have been implemented during the course of 1974. However, little
progress was made largely because the Government had not reached firm con-
clusions about TPO's functions. The Government is currently reviewing TPO's
work program for the next three years with a view to taking measures to
make it more effective. TPO's future role was discussed further during
negotiations for the proposed project in the light of the findings of recent
supervision missions and the Government's plans for strengthening it. The
Government has agreed, as a condition of effectiveness of the proposed loan,
to submit to the Bank its views on TPO's future role and a time-phased plan
to take the steps necessary to perform it (cf. Section 6.01 of the draft
Loan Agreement) and to implement the measures to be agreed upon with the
Bank within one year of the submission of the time-phased plan (cf. Section
3.13 of the draft Loan Agreement).
The Role of the Railways
39. The progress made towards evolving a multi-modal transport system
in Korea has not diminished the importance of the railway network in absolute
terms, although the virtual monopoly it enjoyed a decade ago has been ended
by the investments in highways and ports mentioned above. Over half of the
country's freight traffic (in terms of ton-km) was handled by KNR in 1973;
the fact that over three-quarters of this consisted of bulk commodities which
are especially suitable for rail transportation indicate the crucial role it
can be expected to play in the future. Further, despite increasing
competition in recent years from the well-organized highway-bus industry,
KNR carries nearly a quarter of commercial passenger traffic (in terms of
passenger-km). The competition offered by the highways, in carrying both
freight and passengers, is likely to lessen on account of the recent increase
in the prices of petroleum products because the costs of operating trucks
and buses will be higher since fuel costs form a larger proportion of
operating costs of road vehicles than of rail transport. Increased exploit-
ation of Korea's anthracite deposits, which are located in the northeastern
part of the country, will add to the importance of the railways since they
represent the most economical means of transporting coal (The movement of
coal constituted about 37 percent of KNR's freight' traffic in 1973).
40. The system which KNR operates is the most "mature" segment of
Korea's transport sector. The severe damage sustained during the Korean
War was repaired with the help of a large USAID financed rehabilitation
program during the fifties. Since then, a continuing modernization and
expansion program has been financed, in part, by borrowing totalling over
$350 million. As stated in paragraph 37, the Bank Group has helped finance
four projects through loans and credits totalling about $120 million. The
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First Railway Project (Credit 25-KO) was approved in 1962 and consisted of
the laying of new line, the procurement of rolling stock, and technical
assistance for the establishment of a modern accounting and statistical
system. The Second Railway Project (Credit 110-KO) was approved in 1967
and comprised the purchase of rolling stock and locomotives, the expansion
of line capacity and technical assistance aimed at increasing KNR's
operational efficiency. Brief notes on the Third and Fourth Railway Projects
(Loan 669/Credit 183-KO and Loan 863-KO), are given in Annex II; the progress
on these projects is generally satisfactory although some procurement diffi-
culties have been encountered. The Fourth Project was reviewed by the
Korean authorities and a Bank supervision mission in early 1974 and in order
to compensate for the sizeable cost increases of the previous two years, it
was decided to defer some of the less urgent investments originally included
in it. Expenditures amounting to $7.5 million on two urgent items included
in tile Fourth Railway Project, viz. track maintenance equipment and plant
and machinery for workshops will be financed from the proceeds of the
proposed loan.
PART IV - THE PROJECT
41. The proposed project consists of the investments which KNR intends
to make during the last two years of the Third Plan (1972-76) period (except
for expenditures on items being financed as part of the Third and Fourth
Railway Projects); it was appraised by a Bank mission in June/July 1974.
A report based on the findings of the mission (No. 610a-KOA dated March 24,
1975) is being circulated separately. Negotiations were held in Washington
from February 24, 1975 to March 11, 1975 with a Government team led by
Mr. Dong Hwa Lee, KNR's Director General.
42. A Loan and Project Summary is attached as Annex III. The major
components of the proposed project are summarized below:
(a) the completion of the electrification of industrial and
suburban (Seoul) lines;
(b) the completion of centralized traffic control in Seoul;
(c) continuation of double-tracking of the Ho Nam line and
partial doubling of the Tae Baeg line;
(d) the acquisition of 50 diesel and 10 electric locomotives;
(e) the improvement of marshalling yards and bridge strenthen-
ing;
(f) way and structure renewal and improvement;
- 14 -
(g) the acquisition of spare parts for the maintenance of
the fleet of locomotives and wheel sets for passenger and
freight cars;
(h) the purchase of 150 passenger and 2,000 1/ freight cars
and components for heating cars;
(i) plant and machinery for workshops and running sheds; and
(j) technical assistance to finance the training of KNR staff
and the services of an adviser who would assist in the
execution of a motive power and rolling stock maintenance
program.
43. The total project cost is estimated at $292 million equivalent
of which the foreign exchange component is expected to amount to $185 mil-
lion equivalent (nearly 63 percent). The proposed loan of $100 million
would cover the foreign exchange costs of the project items listed in sub-
paragraphs 42 (e) through (j) above (cf. paragraph 52 below); the remainder
of the foreign expenditure will be met through borrowing from other foreign
sources as indicated in the Financing Plan which forms part of Annex III.
The local currency required (Won 52 billion; $107 million equivalent) will be
provided by the Government.
KNR: Staff and Operations
44. KNR is a quasi-autonomous Government agency. It comes under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation but is allowed to maintain
its own accounts; public expenditures on it are separately identified in
the national budget. Ultimate control over its staffing, financial and
operational policies is vested in the Government. KNR's management is
generally satisfactory. The productivity of its staff is comparable in
terms of traffic units per employee (roughly 470,000 in 1973) with that
of Taiwan (462,000) and is better than that of the U.K. (248,000) and
Italy (263,000). The higher pay-scales in the private sector have made
it difficult to retain staff. KNR hopes to meet its requirements of
qualified personnel in disciplines such as accounting, maintenance of
rolling stock and operation of microwave equipment by the improvement
and expansion of its in-service training facilities. Some $100,000 of
the proceeds of the proposed loan have been earmarked to help finance
the cost of overseas training in the maintenance of equipment for selected
members of KNR staff.
45. The analysis of KNR's operating statistics for recent years
reveals that KNR has made good use of its rolling stock and motive power in
1/ 500 of the freight cars, now coming into service are being financed
by the Government.
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handling rapidly rising volumes of traffic. This achievement has, however,
been gained partly at the expense of foregoing the regular maintenance
prescribed for passenger and freight cars and locomotives. This, in turn,
has resulted in breakdowns and idling of capacity with increasing frequency
over the last year or so. KNR is aware of the necessity of remedying this
situation by the introduction of a systematic maintenance schedule along
the lines suggested by the consultants (Touche Ross and Co.) whose services
were provided under the Third Railway Project. The timing of the preparation
of a detailed plan of action based on the recommendations of the Touche Ross
study was discussed and agreed uupon during negotiations (cf. Section 3.07
of the draft Loan Agreement).
46. KNR and the Bank believe that the execution of the initial phase
of the plan of action would be greatly facilitated by the advice of an expert
in locomotive and rolling stock maintenance. Accordingly, funds amounting to
some $200,000 will be provided under the proposed loan to finance the services
of a suitably qualified technical advisor for a two-year period. Also, about
$2.6 million of the proceeds of the loan will be expended on modernization of
plant and machinery for workshops and running sheds. The lack of funds to
purchase spare parts has also contributed to KNR's poor maintenance of its
motive power and rolling stock fleet. The problem is closely related to the
deterioration of its financial situation in recent years (which is discussed
in paragraphs 47 to 51 below). Some $8.7 million of the proceeds of the
proposed loan have been allocated for the purchase of urgently needed spare
parts for diesel locomotives and track maintenance machines to help alleviate
this difficulty in the short run. Since the spares are to be used for the
existing locomotive fleet and track maintenance units, it is intended to
purchase them on a negotiated basis from authorized suppliers in the interest
of increasing the realization of the benefits of past investment in KNR's
locomotive fleet (part of which was procured under the Third and Fourth
Railway Projects in accordance with the Bank's procedures for international
competitive bidding). The Government has provided an assurance to the
effect that KNR will receive on an annual basis, the local or foreign cur-
rency it requires to purchase urgently needed spares (cf. Section 3.08 of
the draft Loan Agreement).
KNR's Finances
47. KNR operated on a profitable basis till 1970. Since that year,
its revenues have been insufficient to meet its operating expenses and
amortization payments. Its net losses have risen from Won 4.6 billion
($11.5 million) in 1971 to Won 7.1 billion ($17.8 million) in 1973. The
situation has been caused largely by the following factors: (a) the tariff
increases permitted by the Government over the last few years have been
inadequate, both in terms of frequency and magnitude, to compensate for
inflation. During the 1968-73 period freight rates and passenger fares
were increased only once (by 20 percent in 1972 and 32 percent in 1969
respectively); the wholesale price index rose at an average rate of 9 per-
cent per annum during this period; (b) KNR has had to rely on financing
its capital expenditures in recent years almost exclusively through borrow-
ing. Its debt service, which amounted to about Won 2.8 billion ($7.0 mil-
lion) in 1969, and represented about 29 percent of cash generated in that
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year, had risen to Won 14.5 billion ($36.2 million) and was over 60 percent
higher than the cash generated in 1973. 1/
48. KNR's growing financial difficulties were identified during the
appraisal of the Fourth Railway Project in late 1971. The opening of the
Seoul-Busan Expressway in 1970 resulted in a substantial diversion of
passenger traffic to buses. This development was particularly damaging to
KNR's finances since it had been relying on passenger revenues to offset
inadequate freight revenues. The re-structuring of tariffs and raising of
freight rates, as suggested in a traffic costing study carried out by con-
sultants under financed the Second Railway Project, was discussed during
negotiations for the Fourth Railway Project. It was agreed that the Govern-
ment would raise railway tariffs at specified times over the 1974-78 period
and take other appropriate measures to meet certain financial targets in-
cluding the achievement of a rate of return (on net fixed assets in opera-
tion) of 2 percent in 1975, 3 percent in 1976 and 5 percent in 1978. Further,
KNR's overall financial position was to be reviewed each year in consultation
with the Bank to determine and agree upon a course of action to ensure satis-
factory progress towards meeting the objectives of the rate of return cove-
nant (Section 4.07 of the Fourth Railway Project Loan Agreement).
49. The Government, in compliance with these obligations, has increased
railway tariffs by appreciable amounts in 1974. 2/ However, the effect of
these moves has been nullified to a large extent by the large price increases
of the last two years. The urgency of mounting a major maintenance program
coupled with the large expenditures which will have to be made in order to
enable KNR to fulfill its economic role (cf. paragraph 39 above) makes it
imperative for the Government to take further steps to reduce costs and to
improve its earning capacity.
50. Projections made in connection with the appraisal of the proposed
project indicate that even on the assumption that fairly sizeable tariff in-
creases are implemented during the next few years, 3/ KNR will not have a
1/ Cash generated = net operating revenue + depreciation - net non-
operating expenses (cf Annex III).
2/ Freight rates were raised by 15 percent and passenger fares by 25
percent in January/February 1974; further increases which raised KNR's
revenues by about 25 percent were announced in December 1974.
3/ Tariff increase as follows:
Year Passenger Fares Freight Rates
1976 20 percent 25 percent
1977 10 percent 20 percent
1978 10 percent 10 percent
1979
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positive net revenue until 1978 at the earliest (cf. the KNR's 1969-79 In-
come Statement, attached in Annex III). A cash-flow analysis (also attached
in Annex III) shows that KNR's mounting debt-service burden over the next
few years will also pose serious problems, even if new borrowing is res-
tricted to cover only the foreign exchange capital expenditures from 1975
through 1979.
51. KNR's planned investments for 1975-76 are of high priority given
the crucial nature of the services it provides. KNR also envisages incurring
sizeable capital expenditures over the 1977-79 period. Therefore, the
Government has decided to strengthen KNR financially. During negotiations,
the Government reaffirmed that it realized the importance of adopting
measures to enable KNR to generate revenue sufficient to cover its operating
expenses, meet its debt service obligations in full and make some contribution
towards capital investment. The Government intends to formulate a financial
recovery plan with the objective of enabling KNR to meet the financial
targets mentioned above no later than its fiscal year 1980 (cf. Section 4.06
of the draft Loan Agreement). In the interim, in order to provide KNR with
the funds necessary to finance its medium term financial expenditures,
especially those related to 1975-76 Investment Plan, it has agreed to pro-
vide funds to cover all of KNR's debt service obligations including those
contracted in the past. This arrangement, which is expected to strengthen
KNR's financial position markedly, will continue until the implementation
of a financial recovery plan acceptable to the Bank (cf. Section 3.02 of the
draft Loan Agreement and the draft Supplemental Letter on "MNR's Financial
Situation"). Further, the Government has also agreed that KNR will consult
with the Bank to establish the economic, technical and financial justification
of majorcapital expenditure to be undertaken during the 1977-1979 period
prior to any commitment being made (cf. Sections 3.11 and 3.12 of the draft
LoanAgreement).
Procurement
52. All items to be procured under the proposed loan (except the spare
parts referred to in paragraph 46 above) will be subject to international
competitive bidding in accordance with the Bank's Guidelines. The procurement
of spare parts, needed to build up a stock sufficient for the existing track
maintenance machines and those for adequate regular maintenance of diesel
locomotives (cf. paragraph 45 above), and involving expenditures of about
$8.7 million will be negotiated with original suppliers in consultation with
the Bank. In bid evaluation Korean manufacturers of equipment will be allowed
a preferential margin of 15 percent of the c.i.f. cost of competing imports
or the relevant prevailing level of customs duties, whichever is the lower.
Should local bids, in response to international tenders for bridge girders,
passenger and freight cars, wheel sets and portal cranes, be successful,
local cost financing from the proceeds of the proposed loan to the extent of
the equivalent of $27 million would be involved.
Disbursement
53. Disbursement would be made on the basis of 100 percent of: the
c.i.f. cost of imported equipment and materials; the ex-factory cost of
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locally manufactured equipment and materials if local bidders are successful;
and the foreign exchange costs of technical assistance. A disbursement
schedule is given in Annex III.
Benefits and Justification
54. KNR's 1975-76 Investment Plan has two major elements:
(a) investments to increase the capacity for coal transport;
and
(b) other investments, which cover track renewals and bridge
strengthening, track equipment, signalling and telecom-
munications, purchase of motive power, freight cars and
passenger cars, improvement of workshops and sheds, and
some yard and line capacity increases.
55. Investments related to coal transport are intended to enable KNR
to carry increasing long-distance coal traffic between the production points
in the northeastern part of Korea and the consumption points. The railway
is the most efficient means of transporting coal since there are no econo-
mically feasible alternatives. In 1973, KNR carried 13.6 million tons and
3.2 billion ton-km of coal, and by 1976, this traffic will reach 17.6 million
tons and 4.1 billion ton-km (against the original 1972 estimate of 13.8 mil-
lion tons and 3.2 billion ton-km). The substantial increase in estimated
coal traffic has resulted from the increases in oil prices, which have
affected Korea's balance of payments situation adversely. In 1973, petroleum
imports, upon which the bulk of the country's energy sources now depends,
were estimated at about 110 million barrels, at a cost of $330 million equiv-
alent (based on c.i.f. prices). In 1974, the total cost of crude oil imports
were expected to amount to $1.2 billion; this increase in the oil import
bill is equivalent to 80 percent of the estimated current account deficit
for 1974.
56. The Government has taken and is taking measures to conserve
energy in order to save foreign exchange. It is also encouraging coal
production as an alternative to petroleum. Investments amounting to $180
million in coal mining, storage and transport facilities (amounting to
$99 million) are planned for 1975 and 1976. It is expected that this will
increase coal production by 2.6 million tons and 3 million tons in 1975 and
1976 respectively. Since a ton of coal would substitute for about 4 barrels
of oil if the c.i.f. price of crude oil is $10.20 per barrel, savings of
$109 million and $126 million in foreign exchange would result in 1975 and
1976 respectively. Taking into account coal production costs, the benefit/
cost ratio at present prices would be of the order of 3.3:1 and the return
on the investment in the first year would be over 50 percent.
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57. The other investments under the proposed project which are esti-
mated to cost $238 million are aimed at increasing capacity largely through
the purchase of freight cars, passenger coaches and motive power and improv-
ing signalling, marshalling yard and line capacity. These are designed to
ensure the efficient operation of KNR and to increase its capacity to handle
the growing traffic, limiting to a minimum increases in operating costs and
improving the quality of service and safety. These investments will
result in savings in operating costs and will prevent the diversion of traffic
to other more costly modes. The economic rate of return on these investments
is estimated to be about 29 percent.
PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY
58. The draft Loan Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the
Bank, the Report of the Committee provided for in Article II, Section 4 (iii)
of the Articles of Agreement, the text of a Resolution approving the proposed
loan and the draft Supplemental Letter on KNR's financial situation are
being distributed to the Executive Directors separately. The draft Loan
Agreement follows the general pattern of loan agreements relating to railway
projects.
59. I am satisfied that the proposed loan would comply with the
Articles of Agreement of the Bank.
PART VI - RECOMMENDATION
60. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed
loan.
Robert S. McNamara
President
Attachments
March 26, 1975
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KOREA
THE STATUS OF BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
A. Statement of Bank Loans and IDA Credits (as at February 28, 1975)
Loan or US$ Million
Credit Amount (less cancellations)
Number Year Borrower Purpose Bank IDA Undisbursed
Five loans and credits fully disbursed 24.7 39.7
600 1969 ADC Irrigation 45.0 8.0
151 1969 Republic of Education 14.8 3.1
Korea
669 1970 Republic of Railways 40.0 2.9
Korea
234 1971 Republic of Livestock 7.0 .4
Korea
735 1971 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 30.0 1.3
769 1971 Republic of Highways 54.5 1.4
Korea
283 1972 Republic of Irrigation 15.0 7.8
Korea
795 1972 ADC Irrigation 33.0 32.b4
335 1972 Republic of Agricultural Cr. 10.5 3.2
Korea
863 1972 Republic of Railways 40.0 16.6
Korea
905 1973 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 40.0 11.0
906 & 1973 Republic of Education II 23.0 20.0 42.8
394 Korea
917 1973 Republic of Ports 80o0 77.5
Korea
942 1973 Republic of Seeds Production 7.0 6.8
Korea
953 1974 Republic of Tourism 25.0 25.0
Korea
956 1974 Republic of Highways II 47.0 33.7
Korea
99h* 1974 AFDC Agriculture 13.0 13.0
1070 /a 1975 Republic of Secondary Cities 15.0 15.0
Korea
Total 517.2 107.0 301.9
of which has been repaid 12.3 0.3
Total now outstanding 504.9 106.7
Amount sold 2.0
of which has been repaid 0.8 1.2
Total now held by Bank and
IDA (prior to exchange adjustment) 503,7 106.7
Total undisbursed 26 7 3. 301.9
/a Not yet effective * Declared effective on March 19, 1975
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B. STATEMENT OF IFC INVESTMENTS (as at February 28, 1975)
Amount in US$ million
Year Obligor Tyrpe of Business Loan Equit Total
1968 KDFC Development financing 
- 0.7 0.7
1969 Honam Silk Co. Textiles 1.4 0.3 1.7
1970 Atlas Paper Co. Pulp and paper 4.5 0.5 5.0*
1971 Korea Investment Capital market 
- 0.7 0.7
and Finance Corp. development
1973 KDFC Development Financing 
- 0J4 0.4
1974 Gold Star & Co. Electronic Products 16.0 1.3 17.3
Ltd.
1974 Korea Investment Capital market 
- 0.3 0.3
and Finance Corp. development 
-
Total gross commitment 21.9 4.2 26.1
less cancellations, terminations,
repayments and sales 9.6 0.5 10.1
Total commitments now held by IFC 12.3 3.7 16.0
Total undisbursed 8.9 _ 8.9
* Cancelled at the request of the Company
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PROJECTS IN EXECUTION -
Loan No. 600 Pyongtaek-Kumgang Irrigation Project; US$45.0 million
Loan of May 23, 1969; Closing Date: December 31, 1976
The Project includes irrigation for about 35,000 ha, improvement
of drainage and roads, consolidation of paddy fields, benching of upland and
tidal land reclamation. Construction was delayed by a reorganization of the
executing agency and a delay in hiring consultants. The major project com-
ponents (two sea dikes, the main distribution system and pumping plants)
were largely completed by the end of 1974. Contracts for nearly all of the
remaining work have been awarded. Cost considerations have led to the exclu-
sion of about 5,000 ha of land from the project. Costs have risen from US$90
million at appraisal to about US$130 million largely because of the increased
costs of right-of-way, engineering, administration and land consolidation.
Preliminary estimates indicate increases in the price of rice will partially
offset the effects of higher costs and reduced irrigable area. The economic
rate of return is now estimated to be about 10 percent, compared with the
appraisal estimate of 14 percent. The implementing agency (ADC) has re-
viewed ways of economizing on the remaining work which should lead to some
marginal cost savings. About 82 percent of the Loan has been disbursed.
Construction is progressing satisfactorily and is scheduled for completion
by mid-1976.
Credit No. 151 First Education Project; US$14.8 million Credit
of June 4, 1969; Closing Date: December 31, 1975
This Project comprises: (a) the expansion and equipping of 27
technical, commercial and agricultural high schools, 5 post-secondary
higher schools and 4 university teacher training departments; and (b) 26
man-years of technical assistance and 20 man-years of overseas fellowships
to support the development of agricultural and technical education. Project
implementation, which was slow at commencement, has improved and the project
is now 12 months behind schedule compared with the 15 months delay estimated
a year ago. All civil works, furniture procurement, technical assistance
and fellowships have been completed; 70 percent of the equipment has been
procured and the remainder is expected to be delivered during 1975. The
Credit is expected to be fully disbursed by the present Closing Date.
1/ These notes are designed to inform the Executive Directors regarding
the progress of projects in execution, and in particular to report
any problems which are being encountered, and the action being taken
to remedy them. They should be read in this sense, and with the under-
standing that they do not purport to present a balanced evaluation of
strengths and weaknesses in project execution.
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Loan No. 669 Third Railway Project; US$40.0 million Loan and
Credit No. 183 US$15.0 million Credit of May 14, 1970; Closing Date:
December 31, 1975
The bulk of the Loan and Credit was earmarked for the purchase of
freight cars, diesel locomotives, and telecommunications and track mainte-
nance equipment. Progress is generally satisfactory except for delays in
the procurement of some microwave equipment which has been re-tendered.
Credit No. 234 Integrated Dairy Beef Development Project;
US$7.0 million Credit of February 11, 1971;
Closing Date: March 31, 1977
The development of about 700 small and medium-sized dairy farms
by providing long-term loans and the construction and operation of two
dairy products processing plants are the principal components of the
Project which also includes the provision of management and technical
services. Project execution has been satisfactory. To date, about 591
farmers have participated and farm loans of about US$4.5 million equivalent
have been approved. About 4,900 head of cattle have been purchased and two
dairy plants have been constructed and are in operation. The proceeds of
the Credit, except those earmarked for technical services, are expected
to be fully committed by the end of this month.
Loan No. 735 Third Korea Development Finance Corporation Project,
US$30 million Loan of May 14, 1971; Closing Date:
August 31, 1975
The Project is progressing satisfactorily. The Loan is fully
committed.
Loan No. 769 First Highway Project; US$54.5 million Loan of
June 29. 1971; Closing Date: November 30, 1975
The construction of approximately 370 km of national highways
between Jeonju and Busan was satisfactorily completed in December, 1973,
at a final cost about five percent above the appraisal estimate. Feasi-
bility studies and detailed engineering have been completed for 1,400 km
and 900 km of national highways, respectively. A study of road maintenance
and the establishment of a pilot maintenance organization formed the basis
of the creation of a country-wide Highway Maintenance Organization which is
being carried out under the Second Highway Project.
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Loan No. 795 Yong San Gang Irrigation Project; US$33.0 million Loan
Credit No. 283 and US$15.0 million Credit of February 2, 1972; Closing
Date: September 30, 1977
This Project aims at transforming an area with the highest drought
frequency in Korea into one with year-round irrigation and crop diversifica-
tion. Also, there will be increased production of high value crops such as
fruits and winter vegetables. Design work is proceeding satisfactorily and
the work on four dams, the main canals and land consolidation has started.
Award of the three remaining major contracts anticipated for canals and land
consolidation will be delayed until next summer, with construction to start
after the rice harvest, i.e. roughly a year later than scheduled at appraisal.
The delay was caused mainly by financial difficulties attributed to price
escalation and design modification. The cost increases will be partially
compensated for by benefits attributable to the enlargement of the area to
be irrigated by about 1,400 ha.
Credit No. 335 Agricultural Credit Project: US$10.5 million
Credit of September 29, 1972; Closing Date:
September 1, 1976
The Credit supports a three year lending program to small farmers
to develop orchards, sericulture and mushroom production and to encourage
the breeding of poultry and swine. It also finances an organizational and
accounting study of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF)
and the strengthening of its training facilities. The Project is progress-
ing satisfactorily and its disbursement is proceeding on schedule.
Loan No. 863 Fourth Railway Project; US$40.0 million Loan of
November 22, 1972; Closing Date: December 31. 1976
The main elements of the Project are: electrification of lines
in the Seoul suburban area; purchase of electric railcars and locomotives;
the completion of electrification of 350 km of line running from Seoul to
the northeastern part of Korea; track and bridge renewal; provision of yard
facilities; acquisition of passenger and freight cars; and improvement of
facilities for the maintenance and repair of motive power and rolling stock.
No major problems have been encountered; about 90 percent of the Loan pro-
ceeds have been committed.
Loan No. 905 Fourth KDFC Project; US$40.0 million Loan of June 13,
1973; Closing Date: December 31, 1977
The Project is progressing satisfactorily.
ANNEX II
Page 6 of 8 pages
Loan No. 906 Second Education Project; US$23.0 million Loan and
Credit No. 394 US$20.0 million Credit of June 13, 1973; Closing
Date: December 31, 1977
The Project provides equipment for and extensions to the buildings
of: 18 technical and 14 agricultural high schools; ten higher schools/junior
colleges for industrial, agricultural, fishery and nursing training; colleges
of agriculture, engineering and natural sciences in nine universities and a
merchant marine college; and ten junior teacher colleges and 12 colleges of
education. It also includes pre-investment studies on health and management
education. Project implementation has improved and is now six months behind
schedule compared with nine months a year ago. Construction and equipment
procurement are proceeding satisfactorily. Cost overruns on civil works,
to be financed by the Government, are expected to be large due to the recent
sharp increase in building construction costs. It is expected that the Proj-
ect will be completed on schedule.
Loan No. 917 Ports Project; US$80 million Loan of June 27, 1973;
Closing Date: June 30, 1979
The Project includes the provision of container and bulk cargo
facilities and equipment at Busan and coal piers and handling equipment
at Busan and Mukho. Some contracts for dredging and pier construction
have been awarded. The design-work and preparation of tender documents
for the remaining items are proceeding satisfactorily. Revised cost
estimates show an increase of about 30 percent over appraisal estimates.
A Phase II Port Development Study and consultants' services in connection
with the establishment of a "Korean Port Authority" are proceeding satis-
factorily.
Loan No. 942 Seeds Project; US$7.0 million Loan of November 16,
1973; Closing Date: December 31, 1978
The Project consists of: (a) the installation of five field crop
seed processing and storage facilities; (b) farm machinery for seed produc-
tion; (c) procurement of seasonal seed inventories through the operation of
a revolving fund; (d) seed testing laboratories and equipment; (e) crop
research (financed in part by USAID); (f) feasibility studies for irrigation
and area development; and (g) technical assistance. The Office of Seed Pro-
duction and Distribution was established in November, 1974. The Government
is finalizing a contract for consultant's services.
ANNEX II
Page 7 of 8 pages
Loan No. 953 Kyonpgju Tourism Project; IJS$25.0 million Loan of
January 4, 1974; Closing Date: December 31, 1978
The Project forms part of the first phase of the planned develop-
ment of the Bomun Lake resort near Kyongju. It provides for a multi-purpose
dam; an irrigation system for about 1,200 ha; improvement and expansion of
the water supply and sewerage and solid waste disposal systems for the city
of Kyongju and the resort area; installation of electrical supply and tele-
communication facilities for the resort area; the construction and/or re-
alignment of about 57 kms of roads; infrastructure including storm water
drainage, environmental sanitation, community facilities, a golf course, a
school for training hotel personnel; and a feasibility study for the devel-
opment of tourism on Cheju Island. The Loan was declared effective on May 6,
1974. Final design for almost all Project components is complete and the
first four contracts have been awarded.
Loan No. 956 Second Highway Project; US$47.0 million Loan of
January 25 1974; Closing Date: December 31, 1977
The Project, which forms part of the Government's 1972-76 road
construction and paving program, consists of the construction, chiefly on
new alignments, of about 130 kms of highways; feasibility studies by con-
sultants of about 1,000 kms of national and provincial roads, followed by
detailed engineering where justified; and the procurement of highway main-
tenance and workshop equipment for the extension of a new highway mainte-
nance program from a pilot province to the remainder of the country. All
construction and paving contracts have been awarded.
Loan No. 994 Integrated Agricultural Products Processing Project;
US$13.0 million Loan of June 7, 1974; Closing Date:
June 30, 1979
The Project aims at integrating the on-farm production of com-
mercial crops for export with efficient hygienic processing facilities
using land that is presently idle or underutilized. It comprises (i)
on-farm development of asparagus, oak mushrooms and mushrooms; (ii) con-
struction of and improvements to facilities to process asparagus, oak
mushrooms, mushrooms and fruits; and (iii) technical assistance including
training of staff, services of consultants, etc. The terminal date for
effectiveness of the Loan has been extended to April 15, 1975, to provide
additional time for recruiting a Project Manager. The selection of a
proposed Project Manager has been approved and, consequently, the Loan
was declared effective on March 19, 1975.
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Loan No. 1970 Secondary Cities Regional Project; US$15.0 million
Loan of January 15, 1975; Closing Date: March 31, 1979
The principal aims of the Project are the establishment of an or-
ganizational framework for regional investment, planning and development and
to improve working and living conditions in the secondary cities of the less
developed Gwangju region. The main elements of the Project are: (i) housing
sites and services in the cities of Yeosu, Mogpo and Gwangju (370,384 m2);
(ii) a fishery harbor complex with industrial processing zone (215,385 m2)
in Yeosu; (iii) a city market in Suncheon City (33,160 m2); and (iv) access
roads i Yeosu and Mogpo (6.61 km). It also provides technical assistance
to strengthen regional planning and development, to improve the utilization
of existing water supply systems in the four cities, to assist the manage-
ment and operation of the fishery complex and to carry out feasibility
studies of project proposals identified under the UNDP-financed Phase II
Regional Study.
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FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
LOAN AND PROJECT SUMMARY
Borrower: The Republic of Korea
Beneficiary: Korean National Railroad (KNR)
Amount: US$100.0 million equivalent
Terms: The loan would be for a term of 25 years, including
five years of grace, at an interest rate of 8-1/2
percent per annum.
Project
Description: The Project is KNR's Investment Plan for 1975-76 except
for investments financed out of the proceeds of the
Third and Fourth Railway Loans (669-KO and 863-KO).
The Project will help KNR continue as a major carrier
of freight and passengers by helping in: the upgrading,
modernization and expansion of track, rolling stock,
motive power and other equipment; the improvement of
the efficiency of operation; and its financial recovery.
The main components of the project are: an increase in
station and line capacity and improvements in signalling;
acquisition of rolling stock, diesel and electric
locomotives, spare parts and repair facilities; track
renewal and improvement; bridge strengthening; com-
pletion of electrification of 71 km of industrial
lines; and other miscellaneous items.
Estimated Cost: The following table summarizes the estimated project
expenditure and indicates the components to be fi-
nanced from the proceeds of the proposed loan:
1/
1'rojiecL Expendiutre 1975-]'976
Local Foreign Totcl Local Foreign Total Loan Items
--- W billion --------- ---------US$ million----- USS million
1. New line construction 0.60 - 0.60 1.24 - 1.24 -
2. Electrification
(a) Industrial lines electrification 0.92 3.05 3.97 1.89 6.29 8.18 -
(b) Seoul suburban electrification 0.83 1.41 2.24 1.71 2.91 4.62 -
3. Increase in station and line capacity
(a) Signalling 5.55 3.71 9.26 11.44 7.64 19.08 -
(b) Double tracking (27.3 km.) 4.43 - 4.43 9.14 - 9.14 _
(c) Other works 2/ 9.16 0.81 9.97 18.89 1.68 20.57 1.7 3/
4. Way and structure renewals and improvements and 9.26 7.11 16.37 19.09 14.65 . 33.74 14.6
track maintenance equipment
5. Motive power and rolling stock
(a) Diesel locomotives (50 new), spare parts and
repowering 52 locomotives 0.29 24.43 24.72 0.60 50.37 50.97 8.2 i/
(b) Electric locomotives (10) and spare parts 0.25 5.64 5.89 0.52 11.63 12.15 -
(c) Passenger cars (150) and wheelsets 0.11 8.94 9.05 0.23 18.44 18.67 18.5
(d) Freight cars (2,000) and wneelsets 4.12 17.53 21.65 8.49 36.14 44.63 36.1
(e) Other 2/ 2.60 1.20 3.80 5.36 2.48 7.84 1.4 5/
6. Motive power and rolling stock repair 0.62 1.26 1.88 1.28 2.59 3.87 2.6
facilities
7. Miscellaneous
(a) Technical assistance and staff training - 0.15 0.15 - 0.30 0.30 0.3
(b) Other ]/ 2.67 0.21 2.88 5.51 0.44 5.95 0.4
8. Total 1 to 7 41.41 75.44 116.84 85.39 157.56 240.95 83.8
9. Contingencies
(a) Physical 3.96 2.78 6.74 8.15 5.74 13.89 3.0
(b) Price 6.30 11.54 17.84 12.99 23.79 36.78 13.2
10. GRAND TOTAL 51.67 89.76 141.43 106.53 185.08 291.61 100.0
NOTE:
1/ In this table, bridge girders, passenger cars and fr'!ight cars except 500 gendola cars procured in 1974,have been H
assumed as fully imported.
2/ See Table 10 for details
3/ Consists of rails for line capacity incredsc.
/ The proposed loan will finance spare parts only. BaLaice for locomotive finance by US Export-Import Bank
5/ The proposed loan will finance only equipment for heating cars. Balance for the re-engining of railcars
being financed by Governient (on going schpnic).
S/ Replacing of tUcltet print.ng machines.
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Financing Plan: The financing plan proposed for the project is
summarized below:
US$ Million
Equivalent Percent
Government 106.5 36.5
IBRD Loan 100.0 34.3
U.S. Export-Import Bank 48.4 16.6
Kreditanstalt fur
Wiederaufbau (KfW) 9.3 3.2
European Consortium (for
electrification) 21.3 7.3
Suppliers' Credits and
other 6.1 2.1
Total 291.6 100.0
Estimated
Disbursements: Bank Fiscal Year Yearly Cumulative
US$ million
1976 35.4 35.4
1977 62.6 98.0
1978 2.0 100.0
Procurement
Arrangements: All items to be procured under the proposed loan
(except spare parts) will be subject to interpational
competitive bidding in accordance with the Bapk's
Guidelines. The procurement of spare parts, peeded
to build up a stock sufficient for the existing track
maintenance machines and those for adequate regular
maintenance of diesel locomotives (cf. paragraph
46 above), and involving expenditure8 of about $8.7
million will be negotiated with original suppliers in
consultation with the Bank. In bid evaluatiop Korean
manufacturers of equipment will be allowed a preferential
margin of 15 percent of the c.i.f. cost of co#rpeting
imports or the relevant prevailing level of customs
duties, whichever is the lower. Should local bids, in
response to international tenders for bridge girders,
passenger and freight cars, wheel, sets and portal cranes,
be successful, local cost financing from the proceeds
of the proposed loan to the extent of the equivalent of
$27 million would be involved.
Appraisal Report: No. 610a-KO, dated March 24, 1975.
CASH FLOW STATEMENT 1969-1979
(Won Billions)
Actual Forecast
1969 1970 1971 1972 i973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
SOURCES OF FU`DS
Cash Generated By KNR
Net Operating Revenue 7.9 5.3 (0.6) 1.8 2.7 (0.3) 4.3 * 9.4 19.5 32.1 33.6
Depreciation 3.5 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.9 7.3 9.2 10.9 12.0 13.1
Net Non Operating Revenue (Expense) (1 8) (0.5) (0.7) 0.1 1.3 1.7 2.7 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.8
Total Cash Generated 9.6 8.7 2.7 6.4 8.9 7.3 14.3 19.0 31.3 45.4 48.5
Government Operating Subsidy 1.5 5.9 3.8 - - - -
Increase in Severance Pay Provision 0.6 - 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Funds Provided by Government 0.5 2.5 1.5 - 0.8 - 31.2 36.5 22.4 10.5 12.0
Borrowing:
Proposed Bank Loan - - - - - 15.0 33.5 - - -
Other 10.5 6.2 45.8 6.9 27.4 47.0 33,6 18.5 33.5 24.8 31.5
Total Borrowing 10.5 6.2 45.8 6.9 27.4 47.0 48.6 52.0 33.5 24.8 31.5
Decrease In Other Assets _ - - 22.9 - - - _ - - -
Total Sources of Funds 20.6 17.4 50.0 36.2 38.6 60.8 97.9 108.0 87.8 . 81.4 92.8
APPLICATION OF FUNDS
Capital Investment - Local Currency 15.5 23.9 30.6 17.9 17.3 17.2
- Foreign Exchange ___ 26.8 49.1 52.0 33.5 24.8 31.5
Total Capital Investment 11.6 7.2 13.8 24.9 10.5 42.3 73.0 82.6 51.4 42.1 48.7
Debt Service - Interest Charges 1.6 1.8 3.3 5.8 6.5 6.9 11.9 15.7 24.1 26.2 29.0
- Repayment 1.2 3.3 5.5 10.7 8.0 7.9 8.5 8.3 12.1 11.7 12.0
Total Debt Service 2.8 5.1 8.8 16.5 14.5 14.8 20.4 24.0 36.2 37.9 41.0
Increase In Other Assets 0.3 7.9 28.8 - 10.3 - - -
Unexplained Charges to Earned Surplus 0.7 0.1 (0.3) 0.4 2.0 - - - - - -
Net Change In Working Capital 5.2 (2.9) (1.1) (5.6) 1.3 3.7 4.5 1.4 0.2 1.4 3.1
Total Application of Funds 20.6 17.4 50.0 36.2 38.6 60.8 97.9 108.0 87.8 81,4 92.8
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BAlANCE SHEETS
1969-1979
(Wcn Billions)
Fiscal 1969 1970 1911 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Actual Forecast
Current Assets
Cash 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.4 1.4 1.0 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.4 3.0
Accounts Receivable 
- - 3.6 4.5 3.3 4.9 6.2 8.2 9.8 11.2
ToSal Quick Assets 0.5 0.2 0.5 4.0 5.9 4.3 6.5 8.1 10.2 12.2 14.2
Inventory - 6.5 6.8 11.2 3.7 4.0 7.3' 9.9 12.2 13.5 15.0 16.6
Total Current Assets 7.0 7.0 11.7 7.7 9.9 11.6 16.4 20.3 23.7 27.2 30.8
Current Liabilities
Current portion of long-term debit - - - 2.3 2.3 2.8 2.8 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.0
Accounts Payable 
- - - 12.0 11.8 8.6 8.8 11.2 14.2 16.2 16.6
All Other 
_ 
_ 5.3 4.2 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1
Total Current Liabilities 7.7 10.6 16.4 19.6 18.3 15.9 16.2 19.: 23.0 _5.2 25.7
Net Working Capital (0.7) (3.6) (4.7) (11.9) (8.4) (4.3) 0.2 0.4 0.7 2.0 5.1
Fixed Assots
Fixed Assets 173.1 197.4 207.1 257.7 328.4' 409.0 460.4 504.5 555.2
Land 33.9 33.7 130.2 130,2 130.2 130.2 130,2 130.2 130.2
Gross Book Value 184.2 192.8 207.0 231.1 337.3 387.9 458.6 539.2 590.6 634.7 685.4
Less: Accumulated Depreciation 9.7 13.3 17.0 25.8 25.8 36.6 43.9 53 L 64.0 76.0 89.1
Net Book Value 174.5 2T3T l05 . 3 31T= ' z3T 4;6F.l7 376T 3357 7
Add: Construction in Progress . 8.9 7.2 'dj5 24.5 29.1 25.7 28,0 30.0 30,0 28.0 26.0
Total Net Fixed Assets 183.4 186.7 196.5 229,8 340.6 377,0 442.7 516.1 556.6 586.7 622.3
Deferred AssetsI/ 4.4 5.0 32.5 - - 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
Other Assets
Assets Chgd. to l.oan Acct/Not Recd. 0.4 0.1 - - - ) ) )
Investments 1.1 1.9 2.2 4.4 6.4 3.0) 3.0) 3.0) 3.0) 3.0) 3.0)
Prepaid & Other 3.7 10.5 11.6 0.1 0.1 ) ) ) )
Total Other Assets 5.2 12.5 13.8 4.5 6.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
TOTAL ASSETS 192.3 200.6 238.1 222.4 338.7 397.7 467.9 541.5 582.3 613.7 652.4
Long Term Debt 32.1 35.0 75.3 80.5 100.5 162.3 203.0 245.5 267.0 280.0 299.5
Provision for Severance Pay - - - 41.0 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.4 3.0 3.7 4.5
Government Contributions 
- - - - - - 31.2 67.7 90.1 100.6 112.6
Equity and/or OwnershiP 2/
Revaluation of Assets - 68.9 71.4 72.9 77.6 177.1 177.1 177.1 177.1 177.1 177.1 177.1
Fixed Capital (Cash or in kind) 73.2 73.2 73.2 69.7 69.9 69.9 69.9 69.9 69.9 69.9 69.9
Accumulated Surplus (Deficit) 18.1 21.0 16.7 (6.4) (10.1) (13.4) (15.2) (21.1) (24.8) (17.6) (11.2)
Total Equity and/or Ownership 160.2 165.6 162.8 140.9 236.9 233.6 231.8 225.9 222.2 229.4 235.8
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 192.3 200.6 238.1 222.4 338.7 397.8 467.9 541.5 582.3 613.7 652.4
Note - ;/ Deferred loss on foreign exchange fluctuations.
2/ Every five years R.O.K. permits revaluation of land
1972 and 1973 figures adjusted accordirg to audit reports d
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Income Statement
1969-1979
(Won Billions)
Actual Forecast
'iscal
Yec 31 Operating Revenues 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Passenger Revenue 18.1 19.4 17.3 20.7 22.8 29.9 39.3 44.9 47.5 51.9 
5502/
Freight Revenues 11.1 11.1 11.6 13.3 15.7 20.1 26.6 28.8 31.6 
34.7 37.7
Other Train Revenues 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.7 2.4 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.4 
3.7 3.9
Miscellaneous _ _ 0.8 0.6 n.7 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.5 
1.7 1.9
Total COserating Revenue 31.7 33.0 31.2 36.3 41.6 53.8 70.0 78.1 84.0 92.0 98.5
Add: () Pass Fare Increase 2.9 107. 10.5 107 15.7 101 24.n 10% 25.5
(7.) Frt. Rate Increase 2.0 107. 7.6 15 16.4 207. 23.2 107 28.3 57.
Sub Total 4.9 18.1 32.1 47.2 
53.8
Restated Operating Revenues 31.7 33.0 31.2 36.3 41.6 53.8 74.9 96.2 116.1 
139.2 152.3
Less: OperatinRg Expenses
Labor 13.2 13.8 14.3 17.7 24.4 28.4 32.3 
36.3 40.9
Fuel 3.9 4.2 6.3 12.1 14.7 16.7 18.2 
20.n 21.9
Materials & Supplies 7.3 7.9 8.0 12.2 15.3 21.8 24.0 26.4. 29.0
All Other 3.4 4.1 5.4 6.2 8.9 10.7 11.2 12.4 
13.8
Total Cash Expenses- *20.2 23.8 27.8 30.0 34.0 48.2 63.3 77.6 85.7 
95.1 105.6
Add: Depreciation 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.9 7.3 . 9.2 10.9 
12.0 13.1
Total Operating Expenses 23.8 27.7 31.8 34.5 38.9 54.1 70.6 86.8 96.6 
107.1 118.7
Net Operating Revenue (Loss) 7.9 5.3 (0.6) 1.8 2.7 (0.3) 4.3 9.4 19.5 32.1 33.6
Less: Interest Charges 1.6 1.8 3.3 5.8 6.5 6.9 11.9 15.7 24.1 
26.2 29.0
Net Revenue - Railway Operations 6.3 3.5 (3.9) (4.0) (3.8) (7.2) (7.6) (6.3) (4.6) 5.9 4.6
Other Revenue/Extense
Non-Cperating Revenue 0.9 1.0 1.7 1.5 2.4 2.1 2.5 
3.0 3.5
Non-Operating Expense (1.3) (0.5) (0.1) (0.6) (1.0) (3.0) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8)
NnnR-Prrisng Cva,nq, in *I tn 4'b IA Q 3 0.8 1.3 1.3 (0.9) (0.9) (0.9)
Other Revenue/Expense Net (1.8) (0.5) (0.7) 0.1 (3.3) 1.7 2.7 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.8
Net Revenue - (Deficit) 4.5 3.0 (4.6) (3.9) (7.1) (5.5) (4.9) (5.9) (3.7) (7.2) (6.4)
Add R5(K O K Suh^ 1/ - - - 1.5 5.9 3.8 - - -
Net Income - Adjusted 4.5 3.0 (4.6) (3.9) (5.6) 0.4 (1.1) (5.9) (3.7) 7.2 6.4
Add: Depreciation 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.9 7.3 9.2 10.9 
12.0 13.1
Total Cash Income 8.1 6,9 (0.6) 0.6 (0.7) 6.3 6,2 3.3 7.2 19.2 19.5
Operating Ratio 2 75 84 102 95 92 102 94 90 83 
77 78
Interest Charge Coverage - 0.3 0.4 0.4 0,6 0.8 
1.2 1.2
Debt Service 3.4 1.7 - 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
1.2 1.3
Return On Net Fixed Assets 4.4 2.9 - 0.9 1.1 - 1.1 2.1 3.8 
5.9 5.8
Partial compensation for revenues foregone due to not implementing general rate increases in 1973.
2/ 1975 - 1979 figures at 1974 tariffs.
_/ Largely a loss on foreign exchange fluctuations.
N.B. ( ) Indicates Deficit.
Source: Actual, t;NR Unaudited (1973 are audited figures)
Forecast. KNR Staff and mission.
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